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Аннотация. В статье проведен анализ основных составляющих трансакционных из-
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ции.  Это позволило предложить возможные пути минимизации трансакционных издер-
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Introduction. The development of financial market of different countries impact not only in 
finance, but also on the economy as a whole. After all, it serves as a tool to attract additional 
capital to the economy, positive effects on production. We must bear in mind, that different 
kinds and size of transaction costs in various financial markets means alot to investors. Thus the 
higher are transaction costs, the lower number of transactions happens and the less unattractive 
the market is. So, the analysis of transaction costs gives us not only an opportunity to identify 
problem segments, but also to justify directions of institutional system improvement. Therefore, 
improving the ways to minimize transaction costs and thereby increase the attractiveness of 
financial market becomes of greater importance. 
Analysis of recent research and publications. To the transactional theory in general and to 
the transaction costs in particular, dedicated their works such scientists as K. Arrow, R. Coase, 
J. Commons, D. North, O. Williamson, A. Oleynik, R. Kapelyushnikov, A. Shastiko. The 
specific transaction costs on financial market studied S. Arhiyereyev, G. Demsetz, G. Kalach, 
Y. Zinchenko.  
Despite the importance of scientific research of the above scientists, some theoretical and 
practical aspects remain undeveloped. We must say that most works are dedicated to the 
transaction and the transaction costs of the real economy. Instead, such as transactional segment 
of the financial market is insufficiently studied. Of great interest are questions of determining 
the structure of transaction costs, possibilities and ways to minimize them on financial markets 
of the developing countries. All these problems led to the choice of the theme of the research, 
defined its goals and objectives. 
The purpose of the article. The purpose is to analyze the structure of the transaction costs 
on the financial market and study the ways to minimize them. To achieve this goal it is 
necessary to solve the following problems: analyse approaches of determining diferent kinds of 
the transaction costs on the financial market, identify their main components and possible ways 
to minimize them.  
Presenting main material. It should be noted, that in economic theory there is no consensus as 
to how to determine the nature and syllable of transaction costs. Each scientist focuses on the 
components more interesting to his point of view. Thus, O. Williamson focuses on the costs of 
opportunistic behavior;  J. Stigler – at the cost of finding information; M. Jensen and W. Meckling – 
the costs that arise within the relationship principal–agent; A. Alchian and G. Demsetz – the cost of 
coordination between the different resources in the production process; J. Barthel – at cost 
measurement [1, p. 231; 2, p.29–31].  
Our analysis pointed that most often mentioned classification is the one proposed by 
R. Kapeliushnikov. He summarizes major classes of transaction costs that one can find in the 







1. Information retrieval costs. Before you make a deal or contract, you need to have 
information about where you can find potential buyers and sellers of the relevant goods and 
factors of production, what are the current prices. Such costs are made of the time and resources 
costs, required to conduct a search, as well as losses associated with incompleteness and 
imperfection of the acquired information. 
It should be noted, that the costs of searching for information are almost the same for all 
investors, since they consist mostly of the costs of getting information about trading and data 
about the company. However, the losses of using insider information are essential for most 
market participants, as this occurs inefficient and therefore not fair distribution of transaction 
benefits. The market itself is inefficient. Therefore, the development of institutional support that 
would restrict the use of insider information – is one of the question for the developing 
countries regulators. 
2. Negotiating Costs. The market requires the diversion of significant funds to negotiate the 
terms of exchange, to settle and execut contracts. The main tool for saving this kind of costs is 
standardization of contracts. 
Like most transactional costs, the transaction costs on financial markets exposed to the 
effects of "economies of scale". With increasing volumes of transactions, transaction costs per–
unit would reduce. This effect is most clearly seen at the organized market, where there is a 
significant volume of transactions but the cost of transaction is low. 
3. Measurement costs. Any product or service is a set of characteristics. In the act of 
exchange, only some of them are inevitably taken into account, and the accuracy of their 
evaluation (measurement) is approximate. Sometimes wanted qualities are generally 
immeasurable, and surrogates are used to evaluate them. 
As you can see, this type of costs much depends on the possibility of quantitative assessment 
of the object of the agreement. Therefore, on Commodities exchanges, which established strict 
requirements of goods, this type of cost is low. Instead, it is extremely difficult to measure the 
quality of the securities. To minimize the cost of this type on stock exchanges there are strict 
requirements imposed by securities regulations, different listing levels and Rating.  
4. The costs of specification and protection of property rights. This category includes costs 
for the maintenance of courts, arbitration, state bodies, the time and resources needed to restore 
the violated rights, as well as losses from poor specification and unreliable protection. 
In such developing countries, as Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, the system of property rights is 
weak, which is why this type of costs is much higher than that in developed countries. Thus, to 
minimize these costs economic agents can withdraw their capital to countries with a more 
developed system of property rights. 
5. Costs of opportunistic behavior. This is the most hidden and, from the point of view of 
economic theory, the most interesting element of transaction costs. The behavior deviating from 
the terms of the contract is considered opportunistic. This includes various instances of lies, 
deception, etc. The costs of this type arise from the asymmetry of information and are 
associated with difficulties in accurately assessing the post–contract conduct of another party to 
the transaction. Individuals, who are maximizing utility will always shy away from the terms of 
the contract (that is, to provide services of lesser or worse quality) until it does not threaten their 
economic security. 
In organized markets protection against opportunistic behavior through depository and 
clearing structures that perform assets accounting, supply financial assets to the buyer, the 
cancellation of securities accounts of vendors and clearing of securities on the results of trading. 
On Over–The–Counter Market there is no guarantee of implementation of the agreement and 
the protection of opportunism, thus the transaction costs of participants significantly increase. 
As you can see, this classification focuses on transaction costs in real sector or OTC market. 
On the exchange market, there are costs of information searching, broker and depository 
services. Instead, these institutions minimize such costs as costs of measurement, agreements 
implementation, specifications and property rights. 
Quite detailed classification of transaction costs, in our opinion, was made by J. Wallis and D. 








1) ex ante – transaction costs arising prior to an exchange. They include the costs of obtaining 
information about prices and possible alternatives, product quality and reliability of the counterparty, 
etc.; 
2) ex interim – transaction costs arising during the exchange. They consist of costs 
associated with waiting in queues, obtaining notarized documents, settlements etc.; 
3) ex post – transaction costs arising after the exchange and include the costs of defense 
contracts, check of their performance, quality control, etc. 
The strength sight of this classification is that it shows a distinct temporal aspect of transaction 
costs and the fact that they can not be used only interchangeably, but also complementary. Average 
transaction costs in the transaction time is the reason for choosing a particular form of institutional 
protection depending on the individual discounting rules [1, p. 231]. 
However, within the financial markets, transaction costs have their own specifics. Thus, to 
the costs arising before the transaction besides the pointed, should be included the cost of 
entering the market (agreements with brokers, exchanges, depository institutions, purchase 
appropriate software, etc.). Instead, costs incurred during the transaction on organized markets 
are close to zero, because the orders given through special terminals are performed almost 
instantly. The exception is spread – the difference between the best price bids for sale and 
purchase at the same time. Transaction costs that arise after the transaction are mainly costs for 
depository services and most of these costs are performed before the transaction. 
As you can see, this classification accurately reflects the cost structure to the counter market 
in the case when an agreement is settled once. At the same time, the transaction costs on a 
regulated market are carried out mainly ex ante, and the remaining costs are negligible. 
A somewhat different point of view on the transaction costs structure has John R. Commons. 
He provides three types of transactions: transaction bargaining, managerial transaction and 
rationing [4, p. 652]. 
Bargaining Transaction is free redistribution of ownership of rare good between equals 
legally economic agents. This type of transaction is the most common financial market. During 
the transaction an exchange of rights of ownership on financial assets takes place. However, as 
rightly pointed Kuzminov Y. I., Bendukydze K. A. and Yudkevych M. M. interdependence of 
participants of such transaction is caused by rare resources and potential for mutually beneficial 
exchange. Despite equal legal status, ratio of negotiating strength members can be arbitrary, and 
therefore the possible differences in the distribution of excess that arises in this case [5, p. 230]. 
It should be noted also that at the conclusion of the transaction on a regulated market 
transaction costs would be lower and especially their distribution more fairly. And vice versa – 
irregular transaction and stacked on the counter market provide larger transaction costs and 
disproportionate distribution of excess. Thus, regulatory institutions in the first place should 
promote exchange market segments. 
But the assumption back of managerial transactions, by which the wealth itself is produced, 
is that of superior and inferior. Here the universal principle is efficiency, and the relation is 
between two parties, instead of the four parties of the bargaining transaction. The master, or 
manager, or supervisor, or other executive, gives orders –– the servant or worker or other 
subordinate must obey. Yet a change in working rules, in the course of time, as modified by the 
new collective action of court decisions, may distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable 
commands, willing and unwilling obedience. In the managerial transaction individuals act 
voluntarily and not forced. In addition, those whose free will is limited according to the contract 
will get some compensation. 
As you can see, managerial transaction is interpreted rather narrowly and considered in the 
context of labor relations [5, с 231]. Nevertheless, we believe that these transactions inherent the 
segment of financial management as well. First of all, here we include underwriting and 
brokerage services. In addition, managerial transaction are typical for asset management used 
by private pension funds and collective investment institutions. And although while economic 
agents act not as individuals but firms – the result of these transactions is capital growth. Their 
task – is increasing of performance by redistributing responsibilities among economic agents. 
Finally, the rationing transactions differ from managerial transactions in that the superior is 







activities of legislature in matters of taxation and tariff; the decrees of communist or fascist 
dictatorships; the budget–making of a corporate board of directors; even the decisions of a court 
or arbitrator; all of which consist in rationing either wealth or purchasing power to subordinates 
without bargaining, although the negotiations are sometimes mistaken for bargaining, and 
without managing, which is left to executives. They involve negotiation, indeed, but in the form 
of argument, pleading, or eloquence, because they come under the rule of command and 
obedience instead of the rule of equality and liberty. On the borderline are partnership 
agreements, which ration to the partners the benefits and burdens of a joint enterprise. These 
rationing transactions, likewise, in the American system, are subject finally to the working rules 
(due process of law) of the Supreme Court. 
Transaction rationing describes the relationships that are based not on the rights of equality 
and freedom, and the rights of coercion and subjugation. This transaction distributes the costs 
and benefits of wealth creation via the dictates of agents that have a higher legal status. 
Transactions reflect mainly power rationing decisions that determine the distribution of costs 
and benefits of creating social wealth. 
On financial market, this type of transactions arises not only between state regulators and 
market participants, but also between Self–Regulatory Organizations and participants in these 
organizations. While a SRO has the power to create and enforce members’ regulations and 
standards, it can increase transaction costs of participants, which they cannot escape. 
Conclusions and suggestions. As it is shown in the article, the cost structure on the financial 
market is slightly different from the classical structure of transaction costs of the real economy. 
The biggest differences are inherent to the organized market. On exchanges, there are 
significant ex–ante costs (costs of entering the market) while costs that arise during and after the 
transaction (including the cost specification property rights and protection against opportunistic 
behavior) are extremely negligible. 
Thus, a particular analysis of the transaction costs on the financial market has allowed to 
identify the main ways to minimize them. These include: increase market transparency and limit 
the use of insider information, to promote the organized market, improving the existing system 
specification and protection of property rights. Thus, minimizing the transaction costs on the 
financial market will not only raise capital, but also have a positive impact on the economy as a 
whole. 
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